Possibility in a Single World by Ressler, Mark
Possibility in Single World
Mark Ressler
March 1, 2010
Abstract
In response to suspicions concerning the use of possible worlds in phi-
losophy, this brief paper proposes an analysis of possibility that requires
only a single world, using a combination of temporal logic and a poten-
tiality operator.
It is not only ontological scruples that might lead one to be concerned with
the use of possible worlds in philosophy. For my part, I am suspicious of possible
worlds primarily due to their lack of explanatory value. Rather than explaining
the notion of possibility, possible worlds themselves seem urgently to require
explanation. To claim that possible worlds are merely a device used to articulate
the logic of possibility is merely to ignore the demand for explanation. The use of
possible worlds has not made the notion of possibility clearer, but seems rather
to have clouded the issue, particularly given the profusion of modal systems
based upon possible worlds semantics. I intend here to sketch the beginnings
of an alternative analysis of possibility that does not rely on possible worlds,
one that I hope will have greater explanatory value with regard to the notion
of possibility itself.
The initial approach to this analysis is that a possibility is the promise of
an actuality, and that whatever makes this promise must be something in the
actual world. Consequently, the possibility of some sentence being true would
appear to be grounded in the potentiality of something to make it true. Since
this something is within the actual world, there is no need to invoke possible
worlds to explain possibility. A single world will do.
By invoking the notion of potentiality, I do not intend to rely on what
some may consider to be objectionable Aristotelian essentialism. The notion of
potentiality I have in mind is fairly broad. I mean only that entities have certain
abilities, and these abilities are grounded in the actual nature of an entity at a
given time. At a different time, the entity may have quite different abilities. The
truth of certain sentences clearly appears to depend upon the abilities of some
entity, for example the sentence “Friedrich is moving his hands”. Such a sentence
depends significantly upon the state of Friedrich’s musculatory and nervous
system for its truth or falsity, and this dependence represents potentiality as I
understand it here. This kind of potentiality is not merely the potential of one
thing to develop into something else, but more generally the potential of some
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thing for the truth of some statement. I propose that possibility claims always
involve statements whose truth depends upon the potentiality of some entity.
Consequently, let pot be a potentiality operator on a sentence that takes an
additional parameter x, as follows:
potx(α) (1)
where x is some entity, and α is some statement. potx(α) can be read: x has
the potential to make α true. A possibility claim would therefore be based upon
the identification of some entity x with the potentiality for the truth of what is
claimed:
(∃x)potx(α) (2)
However, some possibilities may be grounded in entities that no longer exist,
as in the possibility that Friedrich might have been a pastor, though Friedrich is
sadly no longer alive. Therefore, it would appear that this analysis of possibility
would need to rely on temporality. Let P be the tense logic operator indicating
the past. If I can assume for convenience that whatever entity grounds a pos-
sibility claim has existed at some point in the past, if only a microsecond ago,
a possibility claim based upon an instance of past or present potentiality could
be expressed as follows:
P(∃x)potx(α) (3)
Yet this formulation still does not adequately analyze the notion of possi-
bility, since some possibilities would seem to be grounded in potentialities that
are themselves grounded in other potentialities, as with the possibility that
Friedrich’s son might have become a Buddhist, though Friedrich never actually
had a son and never will. Consequently, it would seem that some possibilities in-
volve nested potentialities. I think this situation could be expressed recursively
as follows, where ♦ is the modal possibility operator:
♦α↔ (P(∃x)potx(α) ∨ ♦(∃x)potx(α)) (4)
Thus according to this analysis, the possibility of α is grounded either in the
potentiality of some past entity to make α true, or in the possibility of some
entity to make α true.
This recursive use of the possibility operator enables the nesting of potential-
ities that some possibility claims require, ultimately grounded in the potentiality
of some past actual entity. For example, the above recursive analysis would yield
the following after a single substitution, eliminating false or irrelevant disjuncts:
♦α↔ P(∃y)poty(P(∃x)potx(α)) (5)
In this case, the possibility of some sentence α is grounded in the potentiality
of some past entity y to bring about the potentiality of some entity x to make
α true, as in the potentiality of Friedrich to have a son with the potentiality
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to become a Buddhist. Other possibility claims may require further levels of
nesting of the potentiality operators.
It seems to me that one merit of this analysis of possibility is that it pro-
vides an approach toward evaluating possibility claims, particularly some of the
wilder possibility claims that have been made. If a philosopher should make an
apparently outrageous claim that something crazy is possible, I think I have the
right to demand on what grounds I should accept that possibility. If the philoso-
pher cannot identify something with the potential to make that particular item
of craziness true, or if the potential is grounded in a god or some other magical
creature to make it true, I would not feel obliged to accept the possibility claim.
Another merit of this analysis is that it allows for the recovery of possible
worlds. Systems of modal logic that use possible world semantics are powerful
devices, and I think it would be a demerit against any analysis of possibility that
required the abandonment of such systems. Possible worlds can be reclaimed
by projecting the state of the actual world subject to the actualization of the
potentialities of certain past entities. If Friedrich had become a pastor, what
would the rest of the world be like? The state of the world subject to the
actualization of Friedrich’s potential to become a pastor would constitute a
possible world. The state of the world subject to the actualization of some other
potentiality would constitute another possible world. The proposed analysis of
possibility also appears to provides an analysis of accessibility relations between
possible worlds in systems of modal logic: One world is accessible to another
through the potentiality of some entity in the second world that could result
in the first world, and inaccessible if there is no chain of potentiality in the
second world that could bring about the projected state of the first world. For
example, if Friedrich in the actual world could not have become an astronaut,
because the state of science when Friedrich existed was insufficiently advanced
to enable space travel, then some proposed possible world in which Friedrich
was an astronaut would not be accessible to the actual world, unless there were
some past entity or a chain of possible entities with the potentiality to advance
the state of science by the time that Friedrich existed such that Friedrich would
have the potential to become an astronaut, assuming that Friedrich would still
have existed had those potentialities been actualized.
A third merit of this analysis is that it offers some means to quantify the
distance between possible worlds. I have been suspicious of claims within episte-
mology that depend upon the notion of close possible worlds. It seems that these
claims mainly rely on some vague intuitive notion of the closeness of worlds, and
unless that notion could be made more precise, I remain dubious of such epis-
temological claims. The proposed analysis of possibility in fact provides two
different measures for quantifying the distance between possible worlds. One
is based on the time involved in the tense logic operator P. Possible worlds
projected from the potentialities of entities that existed only a short while ago
would seem to be closer to the actual world than possible worlds projected from
the potentialities of entities that existed several millennia ago, since much would
have happened as a result of the actualization of potentialities that were not in
fact actualized longer ago. Another measure is based upon the level of nesting
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of the potentiality operators. Possible worlds projected from the potentialities
of entities that are themselves merely potential would seem to be much farther
from the actual world than possible worlds projected from the potentiality of
actual entities, since there would seem to be less chance of the actualization of
potential potentialities than the actualization of actual potentialities. It is not
clear how these two measures would work together with regard to epistemologi-
cal claims relying on closeness of possible worlds, but if they did not work at all,
I would not consider it an unfortunate situation with regard to those dubious
claims, let alone a demerit against the proposed analysis of possibility.
Of course, it is not clear that the proposed analysis will ultimately be ade-
quate to capture the nature of possibility. Nor have I investigated the effect of
this analysis on existing controversies concerning modality, such as quantifying
into modal contexts, de re and de dicto modality, identity, and essence. I merely
offer the analysis here as a proposal for broader consideration, in the hopes that
even if it fails, perhaps greater stimulus will thereby be given to the search for
a better explanation of possibility.
Finally, it might be thought that this proposed analysis represents a species
of naturalism, since it seems to rely on natural entities and thereby seems to
reduce all kinds of possibility to natural or nomological possibility. To the
contrary, I would point out that the proposed analysis does not impose any
restrictions on the entities that appear within potentiality claims, nor is the
notion of potentiality restricted to natural or causal potentiality. Indeed, an
analysis of natural possibility in terms of natural entities seems particularly
neat and elegant under this analysis. Yet the x term in potx(α) could just as
well be a system of logic, such that the potentiality of the system for the truth of
a sentence would represent logical possibility, where this potentiality is clearly
not causal. I suggest that in this way the various kinds of possibility might be
categorized according to the kinds of entities that appear within the potentiality
operator. I suspect, though, that some kinds of possibility ultimately depend
on the imaginations of certain philosophers. I could be wrong.
http://www.markressler.com/doc/Possibility-in-a-Single-World.pdf
4
